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A Genealogy of Crisis: Europe’s Legal 
Legacy and Ordoliberalism
Bo Stråth
Law as legacy and Europe’s genealogy of crisis
This book is about the role of the legacy of Roman law in the transformation from 
fascism to the European integration project after 1945. The aim of this chapter is to 
extend the focus on Roman law to another connected legal foundation: ordoliberalism. 
The chapter will also extend the inquiry in time covering the crises in the 1970s and 
since 2008.
Ordoliberalism was an alternative point of reference to that of Roman law in order 
to mark the shift from fascism to European integration. Ordoliberalism provided a legal 
framework for a peaceful Europe with the aim of merging capitalism and democracy. 
Wilhelm Röpke, a protagonist in the elaboration of ordoliberalism, commented on the 
connection between Roman law and ordoliberalism, as we shall see. The key focus of 
this chapter is the ordoliberal and Roman legacy during the two crises of the 1970s and 
since 2008.
The point of departure of this book is that, during the war, exiled German scholars 
in Britain discovered Roman law as a European historical heritage on which one could 
build a new and peaceful post-war Europe. Simultaneously, Mussolini exploited the 
same Roman heritage in order to legitimize his fascist regime. Romanitas, the key 
concept of his outline of the Roman legacy, dealt with law, justice and order.
Hitler and the Nazis rejected the legacy of Roman law, instead hailing the myth 
of old Germanic law and proto-Germanic societies of free equals under a chieftain 
− supported by race biology, the geopolitical Großraum theory, and the search for 
the original Aryan home in a mythical North through philology, archaeology 
and anthropology.
This fascist-Nazi difference increases the complexity of ideological debates and the 
search for origin and roots, stability and continuity in a chaotic time. A general search 
was under way for historical points of reference and authority as an instrument to 
master the future. However, the decisive point was not whether the normative roots 
were Roman or Germanic, because both filled similar functions, but the fact that the 
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search led to the derivation of very different origins among those who were looking for, 
for example, the Roman legacy.
Few outlined the Roman law basis of dreams of a future peaceful Europe in reaction 
to the horrors of the Second World War more emphatically than Paul Koschaker. In 
1947, he published his most famous work, Europa und das römische Recht, and, before 
his death in 1951, he experienced the beginning of the debate on the connection 
between Roman law and a peaceful post-war Europe. After 1945, both Roman law and 
Europe were in a state of deep crisis and Koschaker’s project dealt with the restoration 
of both in the construction of a common European legal culture. In his search for 
solutions to the crisis of both Roman law and Europe, Koschaker went backwards and 
ended in Savigny’s historical school. He depicted European history and European legal 
culture as a teleological continuity from the Roman Empire via the Holy Roman Empire 
to the twentieth century. He thereby conflated pre-Christian Rome and Catholic 
Rome (Koschaker 1938; Koschaker 1947). His approach fitted well with the fact that 
the founding fathers of the European post-war integration project were Christian 
Democrats and Catholics. The doctrine of the Catholic Church acknowledged Roman 
law in its connection to natural law theory, which linked up with ideas of universalism 
and divinity as a legal origin as opposed to man-made positive law. The contours of a 
foundation myth emerged.
A problem exists with imageries of legal heritages and legacies. The search for the roots 
of the legal system is in vain. Centuries and millenia of political–legal entanglements 
constitute a powerful genealogy and a filter that sieves the search for the original, for 
the authentic roots of the present. In the past, not one original and undisputed original 
point of departure is available for our observations in the present. Many controversial 
layers of interpretations and reinterpretations of origin have constantly changed views 
on it and our attempt is only another contribution in that long chain. This fulfils the 
purpose of providing a better understanding of our own chaotic present. The search for 
legacies and roots is more about the present than the past.
In his article ‘Foundations of European Legal Culture’ (1990), Franz Wieacker 
shows the complexity of the millenary genealogy of Roman law, beginning with the 
replacement in the empire of the former individual freedom of the urban resident 
(civis Romanus) with diverse corporate freedoms. He shows how, after the fall of the 
Roman Empire, the heirs of Rome as well as the Romanized Iberians, Celts, Illyrians 
and the Germans, who had entered the empire, abandoned the high classical culture 
of Roman law. He shows how the transformation continued in the Middle Ages under 
the influence of the Catholic Church and by the creation of an autonomous legal 
science at the universities. In the early modern period up to the French Revolution, 
the conceptualization and systematization of law was built upon these foundations 
by means of the methodological tools of a new age, dedicated to mathematics and the 
natural sciences. The fragmentation of Christianity and the emergence of centralized 
states reflected the legal transformation in other ways. The modern age after the 
French Revolution, in the framework of the Industrial Revolution, where time seemed 
to accelerate, brought the definite collapse of Western legal metaphysics and the 
emergence of the Rechtsstaat for the protection of private property and the Sozialstaat 
for public welfare (Wieacker 1990). It is no easy task to discern what is Roman and 
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original in this genealogy and to retrieve this argued legacy in today’s European legal 
cultures marked by diversity.
Roman law was, as Wieacker has demonstrated, not a stable reference for all times. 
The crises in the 1970s and since 2008 have brought an intensification of the search 
for new legal points of reference in times when the Roman (and ordoliberal) legal 
foundations of integration had lost the capacity to convince. The search still continues.
The derivation of a Roman origin is not a matter of definition because there is 
no definition, as Nietzsche noted with his statement that what can be defined has no 
history.1 The task is rather to retrieve the contentious meanings of Roman law in various 
historical situations. The term is full of contested meanings, which have emerged in 
political struggles for discursive power (Brunner, Conze and Koselleck 1979‒1997). 
The discursive struggle about the meaning of key concepts is particularly intense in 
times of crisis, when old vocabularies break down and lose the capacity to convince, 
and the search for new legitimizing conceptualizations speeds up (Koselleck 1959).
Therefore, the European genealogy of crisis is important. The (West) European 
unification project after 1945 was built on the experiences of the crisis in the 1930s (and, 
of course, of the two world wars). An argument in the post-war work on unification 
was that integration in legal terms was based on Roman law. The aim was evidently 
to derive a different Roman past for Europe’s future than Mussolini’s. But what, more 
precisely, was this Roman heritage? How stable was it as legitimizing cement? How did 
later crises and challenges influence the connection to Roman law?
The value crisis of the 1930s
The implication of the value crisis of the 1930s was a loss of orientation at a time when 
various versions of democracy, authoritarianism and totalitarianism were competing 
intensely over providing a key to the future. The subsequent world war re-established 
values in terms of good and evil in Western and Eastern European versions. However, 
the question remained of how evil could acquire the power of persuasion that it 
actually did obtain. That question permeated the post-war search for meaning and for 
the final repression of evil.
In the conventional teleological understanding of Europe, democracy broke 
through slowly but inexorably during the nineteenth century, from the stabilizing 
restoration in Vienna after revolutionary and Napoleonic chaos, via the binding of 
monarchical power through constitutions.
A more realistic view on the nineteenth century discerns general constitutionalization 
after Vienna as a successful instrument of restoration through necessary monarchical 
concessions to ward off social protest and revolutionary threats rather than as an 
expression of a breakthrough of popular power. Europe in 1914 was mainly conservative 
and authoritarian. State-based paternalist social politics of stick and carrot integrated 
social protest in an approach where warfare and welfare went hand in hand through 
mutual reinforcement.2
Democracy arrived in Europe only after the two world wars between 1914 and 1945. 
After 1919, in reaction to the First World War, democracy broke through in parallel 
Roman Law and idea of Europe.indb   263 10-10-2018   14:51:15
264  Roman Law and the Idea of Europe
with totalitarian regimes of a new kind: communism, fascism, Nazism. The First World 
War brought the breakthrough of the masses into politics. After their hardships and 
sacrifices on the battlefield and on the home front, there was now no stopping the 
masses. Politics became more difficult to orchestrate than in the former society, with 
dreams of a European concert directed by a benevolent but more or less authoritarian 
state paternalism. The masses protested and rioted. The Russian Revolution was a 
direct consequence of the war. The breakthrough of the influence of the masses did 
not necessarily result in democracy, as we might want to believe, but could also easily 
end in fascism. A mass society presented as much a threat as a promise. The masses 
not only expressed their political preferences in bottom-up processes but could also be 
manipulated in populist and authoritarian top-down politics. This was the backdrop 
to the value crisis of the 1930s.
The value crisis began as an economic crisis after the collapse of the financial 
markets in October 1929. Mass unemployment haunted Europe, and political leaders 
seemed paralyzed before they began to act. They abandoned the gold standard and 
reacted to social protest with protectionism. Their concern was the economic crisis, 
which became a political crisis and a value crisis. They discerned a tension between 
economic liberalism and political liberalism, between capitalism and parliamentary 
democracy with the social question as the catalyst that turned the economic crisis 
into a political crisis and finally a general value crisis about the cohesion of industrial 
capitalist societies.
In his book La rebellión de las masas in 1930, Ortega y Gasset outlined how the 
advent of the masses contributed to the value crisis of the interwar period. Oswald 
Spengler, author of volumes about the decline of the Occident after the First World 
War, warned in Man and Technics (1931) against the destructive force of technology 
and industrial capitalism, while his bestseller The Hour of Decision (1933) – banned 
by the Nazi regime – criticized liberalism for its political and economic shortcomings 
and predicted a coming war that would destroy Western civilization. Other intellectual 
comments on the value crisis against the backdrop of economic depression and political 
turbulence were Dutch historian Johan Huizinga’s In the Shadow of Tomorrow and the 
dystopian future vision of Brave New World by Aldous Huxley (Ortega y Gasset 1930; 
Spengler 1918‒1922; Spengler 1931; Spengler 1933; Huizinga 1935; Huxley 1932). 
One aspect of the value crisis of the 1930s was the difficulty in distinguishing between 
democracy by the masses and totalitarianism for the masses in the wake of the failure 
of global capitalism.
The differences became visible only in retrospect, as Wolfgang Schivelbusch 
demonstrated in his book Entfernte Verwandtschaft (‘Distant Relationship’). The 
value crisis of the 1930s began as an economic crisis after the collapse of the capitalist 
economic order in 1929, which became a general global political crisis. In the search 
for a solution to mass unemployment and social protest, a value crisis arose where 
democracy, fascism, Nazism and communism/Stalinism competed for solutions 
under relations of entanglement as much as demarcation. For example, US President 
Franklin Roosevelt was very interested in Mussolini’s corporatism and Hitler’s public 
employment politics in the design of his New Deal programme. Only after 1935, when 
Hitler and Mussolini began more systematically to connect the solution of the social 
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crisis with expansive warfare for social integration, did the distinction between the 
democratic and totalitarian orders become clear (Schivelbusch 2005). Roosevelt was 
not only interested in solutions by what would later be seen as totalitarian regimes 
but also took to heart the book Sweden: The Middle Way, published by Marquis Child 
in 1936, which soon became a global bestseller. Child’s argument was that Sweden 
had adopted an effective third-way compromise between the two political poles of the 
day: the United States and the Soviet Union, between wild, unruly and unmanageable 
capitalism, on the one hand, and coercive socialism, on the other (Childs 1936). In the 
same vein, the ordoliberal protagonist Wilhelm Röpke saw Switzerland as the model 
of a dritter Weg between laissez-faire liberalism and socialist collectivism (Röpke 1942: 
43). No doubt connections existed between his search for origins in Swiss peasant 
community culture, which merged the ideals of individual and collective freedom, 
and the Nazi–Nordic myth, but Röpke nevertheless emphasized a distinctive Swiss 
character as clearly dissociative from the distorted Nazi fancies of the past.
Between the world wars, in economic and cultural terms, Germany was the 
European hub where crystallization of the crisis occurred. Economic development 
there between crisis and despair on the one side and expansion and reckless 
expectations of the future on the other, between depression and mania, exerted 
a great impact on Europe. The same goes for the cultural tensions in the Weimar 
Republic between futuristic cosmopolitan feelings of forward-thrusting pioneers and 
a xenophobic, narrow nationalism as a tool for revenge and new German greatness. 
The period was a general European oscillation between gloom and hubris; but in 
Germany this was amplified. After 1929, feelings of depression and crisis prevailed, 
with sentiments of economic, political and value crisis and lack of orientation and 
political control reinforcing each other. Germany was the centre of a storm brewing 
over Europe. Coudenhove-Kalergi’s pan-European narrative broke down, as did 
the League of Nations as a kind of world government making the world safe for 
democracy after the First World War.
The philosophical debate at the end of the 1920s and in the early 1930s between 
Martin Heidegger, Ernst Cassirer and Edmund Husserl over what Husserl called ‘the 
crisis of European sciences’ was symptomatic of the search for orientation and a good 
illustration of the Zeitgeist. It was a moment when full social and political recognition 
seemed finally to be given to German Jews, who constituted a significant dimension 
of cultural life and intellectual debate in Germany. Cassirer became the first Jewish 
rector of a German university, in Hamburg. The moment was full of ambiguity and 
contradictions, however. It also contained a new turn in German nationalism, with 
anti-Semitism as a core dimension.
Heidegger had attracted attention with his book Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) 
in 1927 (Heidegger 1927). The book took issue with rationalism and emphasized 
authenticity from an existentialist perspective. Humans were not only thinking but in 
particular acting under conditions of being between life and death. The echo of Ernst 
Jünger’s literary expression of his experiences of life at the front line during the First 
World War as a purifying ‘storm of steel’ is difficult to overhear (Jünger 1929; Jünger 
1930). Heidegger was critical of the philosophical conception of truth and confronted 
the instrumental tradition of technology, with its treatment of nature as a ‘standing 
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reserve’ on call for human purposes. The book was a radical existentialist-hermeneutic 
version of Husserl’s phenomenology. However, as opposed to Husserl, it celebrated 
the ‘will to power’ and appealed to the prevailing mood of the time. The book quickly 
became a point of reference in the public debate.
Husserl had developed phenomenology at a time when the traumatic experiences 
of the First World War imposed doubts on reason and technology based on 
instrumental rationality. In particular, the doubts dealt with the scientific claim and 
conceptualization of truth. Husserl tried to open up the absolute closure of the term 
towards the perception of objects rather than objects as such. Perceptions offered not 
only one but many possibilities of interpretation. In his phenomenology Husserl 
focused on the issue of inter-subjectivity from this point of departure.
Husserl’s Crisis of European Sciences was a last despairing appeal in a debate which 
was closing down and had begun as a much more open confrontation about clear 
alternatives in the wake of Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit. Cassirer was the main opponent 
and the debate between him and Heidegger in Davos in 1929 was a catalyst. Cassirer 
mediated between natural and cultural sciences from a reason-based neo-Kantian 
perspective. He argued that Kant’s critique of pure reason, 150 years before Heidegger, 
emphasized human temporality and finitude but also located human cognition and the 
capacity to use reason within a broader conception of humanity. With this reference, 
Cassirer challenged the relativism of Heidegger, arguing for the universal validity 
of truths discovered by the ‘exact and moral sciences’. In the 1920s he developed his 
philosophy of symbolic forms, where he saw man as a symbolic animal. However, 
whereas animals perceive their worlds by instinct and direct sensory perception, 
humans create a reason-based universe of symbolic meaning with inter-subjective 
objective validity.
Husserl was a professor in Freiburg, where the young Heidegger was his 
assistant. Heidegger dedicated Being and Time to Husserl, who had retired in 
1928, with Heidegger succeeding him. In 1933 the converted Lutheran Jew Husserl 
was suspended from the university and excluded from the library as well as other 
emeritus facilities. A few weeks after revocation of Husserl’s emeritus status, 
Heidegger became rector of the university and joined the Nazi party. Husserl 
taught in 1935‒6 in Prague and Vienna and in 1936 published Die Krisis, which 
described and analysed the crisis of European sciences around concepts such as 
truth, objectivity, reason and rationality (Husserl 1936). Two years later, Husserl 
died in Freiburg, intellectually isolated and abandoned. Only Gerhard Ritter, the 
nationalist-conservative historian, the biographer of Luther and the hagiographic 
portrayer of Prussia, went to his funeral. In his nostalgia for the German Reich as it 
had been before 1914, rather than as it had begun to take shape in a new version at 
this time, Ritter probably felt as alienated as Husserl. After less than a year as rector, 
Heidegger resigned after conflicts with colleagues from the political leadership of 
the university. The question of how much of a Nazi he really had been was one of the 
most contested issues after 1945.
Cassirer left Germany in 1933 for a few years in Oxford and from there to a chair 
at Gothenburg. After the German occupation of Denmark and Norway in 1940, he 
feared that Sweden might be Hitler’s next target and left the following year for the 
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United States, where he died a month before the end of the war in 1945 (Cassirer 1936; 
Jeenicke 2012).
The value debate of the 1920s and the 1930s − against the backdrop of the 
experiences of the First World War, the Great Depression and the breakthrough of 
mass societies − dealt with the question of truth and objectivity. It also dealt with the 
question of sovereignty. Who was the sovereign that controlled and influenced the 
situation? The democracies had a clear answer: the parliamentary assemblies ruling 
and ruled by the constitutions. However, ever more people doubted that solutions to 
problems would be found there.
Politicians in the Weimar Republic began to circumvent domestic social problems 
in search of solutions via military expansion for new economic power. The geographer 
Karl Haushofer and the jurist Carl Schmitt laid the ground with the Großraum theory. 
The Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg (1893–1946) used Lebensraum as a key concept 
in his book Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts (1930). It must here be added that the 
view of a German mission of eastward expansion was conventional in Weimar. Gustav 
Stresemann was keen to keep Poland out of Locarno, for instance.3
The Catholic Schmitt was looking for community and identity at a time that 
felt lacking in both. In Political Theology (1922), Schmitt launched a Catholic-right 
revolutionary critique of the prevailing order. He focused on the power of the sovereign 
to declare a state of emergency, to explain that the law was no longer applicable. He 
rejected the layers of philosophical-political exegeses on the exercise of power that 
had been established over the centuries. What really mattered was control of the 
exceptional case, the moment when somebody has the power to stand up and declare 
that there is no alternative irrespective of what legal rules might apply. Schmitt’s 
argument eventually came to rest on the issue of control of the exceptional situation 
in the political and legal arena. The agent who wields the power to proclaim the 
exceptional situation emancipates himself or herself from norms. Five years later, in 
The Concept of the Political (1927), Schmitt added a definition of what he considered to 
be the deepest essence of the political: the distinction between friend and foe (Schmitt 
1922; Schmitt 1927).
Schmitt identified an obscure legitimacy in mere force of action. In so doing, he 
revealed a blind spot in liberal understandings of law as a universal order framing 
politics. However, although critically astute, Schmitt was unable to conceive of 
legislation by politics as a potentially progressive force and the possible source of 
positive normative developments through criticism of existing institutions. This was 
his blind spot. Politics does not stand above the law, and the law does not stand above 
politics. Rather, law is made and remade by politics; it deals with continuous political 
adjustment to and reformulation of legal checks. Proclaiming a state of exception is not 
the only response to a normative crisis.
The crisis of the 1930s, and reflections on it in philosophical and legal debates, 
and in fiction literature, constituted the framework of experiences when the search 
emerged, during and after the Second World War, for the origin in the past of a better 
European future. This was the framework of experience which made exiled German 
scholars of law and Paul Koschaker to seek firm ground for Europe in their imagery 
of Roman law. No doubt a dimension of escapism existed in the location of their 
intellectual asylum in such a distant past.
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The search for stabilization through law: The ordoliberals 
against Schmitt and against the neo-liberals
Economists also reflected on the crisis of liberalism and capitalism. During the 
Second World War, Wilhelm Röpke became one of the champions in the outline of 
ordoliberalism as a response to the crisis of economic liberalism. Ordoliberalism was 
not so much about economic theory as about the legal and political framing of the 
economy. The Latin word ordo, ‘order’ in English, in its connection to liberalism can 
be translated as legal or law-based liberalism. In this enterprise Röpke also referred 
to Roman law. The German economist wrote in Swiss exile in the second volume of 
his trilogy on the crisis of his time (1944) that ‘we owe to Roman and not to German 
law for a clear distinction between public and private law and are thus indebted to 
the former for the recognition of the individual as opposed to state rights’. On the 
other hand, he continued, ‘The highly developed formal structure of Roman law may 
lend itself to the claims of a centralized absolutism.’4 Röpke thus drew attention to the 
ambiguity of Roman law as a European point of reference.
In this respect, Röpke condensed what Wieacker would later say when discussing 
the legacy of Roman law, which in Röpke’s view could be used to derive both fascism 
and private ownership in a liberal society. In order to bypass this ambiguity, Röpke 
developed a legal-political framework for the economy in a liberal capitalist order 
based on private ownership, a social-liberal version of the Rechtstaat, which had 
emerged in the nineteenth century to protect the new kinds of private contract in the 
industrial capitalist economy. The law-based ordoliberalism mediated between the 
Rechtstaat imagery and the growing claims by the labour movement since the end of 
the nineteenth century for a Sozialstaat, a welfare state.
Röpke did so in the framework of a debate among liberal intellectuals trying to come 
to terms with the crisis of liberalism. In August 1938 some twenty-five people, among 
them the philosophers Raymond Aron and Louis Rougier, along with the economists 
Röpke, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek, Jacques Rueff and Alexander 
Rüstow, met for a colloquium on the crisis of economic and political liberalism. 
Their discussions dealt with the likelihood and preconditions of a liberal renaissance, 
markets and crises, as well as the liberal state and an agenda of liberalism. They 
struggled for a new mobilizing concept for the intellectual movement they planned 
and which they defined as liberal, although demarcated from conventional liberalism, 
which had fallen into ever greater disrepute since the 1870s in a development that 
had accelerated during the Great Depression. The meeting discussed several concepts, 
among them neo-capitalism and constructive liberalism. In the final event it seems 
participants decided that neo-liberalism was the most attractive term, although no 
formal agreement or recorded unanimity was reached (Denord 2001; Denord 2008; 
Valpen 2004; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Jackson 2010).
From this point onwards, mainstream liberalism split into at least two tendencies. 
The German economists Röpke and Rüstow, and with them Walther Eucken (1891–
1950), who was not among the participants at the Paris meeting, became the Vordenker, 
the ‘pre-thinkers’ of the German soziale Marktwirtschaft, based on a belief in a legal 
(ordoliberal) rather than political regulation of the economy. They turned Schmitt’s 
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argument upside down and set law, not politics, as the point of departure for social life 
and economic management.
In Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart (1942) Röpke developed the ordoliberal 
programme on the basis of the argument about a pathological degeneration of 
occidental societies expressed in two dimensions: the intellectual moral and the 
political social economic. Mass societies driven by a borderless relativism called 
positivism and the technical- or technological-organizational orgy of big industry, 
big cities, mass production, proletarianization and extreme division of labour had 
deserted rural community life around free farmers, artisans and small entrepreneurs. 
The rootless masses had brought the crisis of democracy while big industry, 
oligopolies, cartels and monopolies had brought the crisis of capitalism. The crisis of 
socialist collectivism went hand in hand with the crisis of liberalism. Röpke argued for 
a third way, with Switzerland as the model, through a struggle on two fronts: against 
collectivism and against liberalism as it had developed, in need of fundamental revision 
towards competition but with a key role for the state in order to prevent both capital 
concentration and proletarianization. It did not make sense to reject collectivism 
politically without at the same time solving economic and social reform tasks. It was 
a catastrophic failure to regard the market as something autonomous, as a state of 
nature separated from the institutions of the state. Like pure democracy, the rule of 
the masses, undiluted capitalism is also unbearable and indigestible, so Röpke argued. 
It was wrong to ignore the deficiencies of the pure market economy translated into 
rationalistic doctrinism. He concluded,
It in no way contradicts the market economy if the state with the coercive 
instruments at its disposal (in particular by means of taxation) with the purpose 
of more equal distribution undertakes a redistribution of property conditions, and 
as little, if it, let us say from taxation income pays allowances for worker housing 
or for water pipes in mountain villages. … It in no way contradicts an economic 
policy standard that respects our economic constitution if the state on its own 
manages individual enterprises or whole production branches and itself performs 
as producer or trader in the market. The same goes for public work which the state 
undertakes in order to bridge or overcome a depression. (Röpke 1948: 306)
The ordoliberal version in response to the Paris meeting in 1938 – the term neo-liberal 
disappeared from their agenda after a while – sought distinction from laissez-faire 
liberalism, which Rüstow rejected as palaeo-liberalism.
Ordoliberal ideas had been developed even before the Paris meeting in 1938. Two 
manifestos were published in 1932 at the peak of the economic crisis: Eucken’s Staatliche 
Strukturwandlungen und die Krise des Kapitalismus (‘State Structure Transformation 
and the Crisis of Capitalism’) and Rüstow’s Interessenpolitik oder Staatspolitik 
(‘Interest Politics and State Politics’). Franz Böhm’s Wettbewerb und Monopolkampf 
(‘Competition and Struggle against Monopoly’) followed a year later (Eucken 1932; 
Rüstow 1932; Böhm 1933).
The ordoliberals confronted not only laissez-faire but also the conservative historicist 
school and the social democratic imagery of economic democracy founded in the era of 
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Bismarck, when organized modernity emerged in the 1870s. Ideas of corporate interest 
representation and conflict resolution continued to blossom in Weimar reinforced by 
the experiences of the planned war economy as well as by utopian ideas of organic 
community (Stråth 2016: 370). These ideas promoting big business and large-scale 
capital concentration were the target of the ordoliberals as much as laissez-faire 
liberalism. They saw it as their task to provide a legal framing, ordo, of the economy, 
an economic constitution that would safeguard it both from market self-destruction 
and from political conflicts. There was a critique of economic concentration and a 
commitment to strong antitrust law and the imagery of an impartial state monitoring 
the economy and preventing the political conflict spreading there.
The imagery of an economic constitution demarcated from politics was, of course, 
utopian. It nevertheless played an important role not only in Weimar but also in 
particular during the foundation of European integration in the 1950s. A clear 
social dimension was integral to the ordoliberal approach in the shape of the soziale 
Marktwirtschaft, the social market economy as it was to be called after 1945, based 
on the belief in legal (ordoliberal) regulation of the economy determining the scope 
for political intervention. The (West) German approach after 1945 should be seen 
against the backdrop of the experiences of the Weimar Republic as a democracy with 
strong anti-democratic opponents on both the radical right and the radical left. The 
ordoliberal social market-economic post-war order was a rupture in a German history 
of authoritarianism. Rule-governed technocratic monitoring of the economy would 
bring general welfare that would provide political allegiance.
Hayek, on the other hand, developed an alternative view and a theory for the 
liberalization and deregulation of the world economy, where regulation of social 
life would emerge through the market without the mediation of the state. In Hayek’s 
view, regulation meant an inflexible doctrinaire legal framework for the economy, 
rejecting state mediation between social interests. The state should not intervene in 
the market in order to correct shortcomings and failures but should only guarantee 
strict application of market rules. After the German ordoliberals had abandoned the 
term neo-liberal suggested in Paris in 1938, Hayek became the protagonist in defining 
it in economic market-radical terms. In an essay in 1939, Hayek argued for neo-
liberal market discipline through interstate federalism. In his brief article he drafted 
an economic and monetary federation that would function as a tool to do away 
with impediments on free movement of ‘men, goods, and capital between the states’, 
enabling creation of common rules of law, a uniform monetary system and common 
control of communications. All monetary policy would have to be a federal matter, as 
opposed to a state matter. The imposition of market rigidity was a matter of monetary 
policy as well as commodity and labour standards:
While the states could, of course, exercise control of the qualities of goods and 
the methods of production employed, it must not be overlooked that, provided 
the state could not exclude commodities produced in other parts of the Union, 
any burden placed on a particular industry by state legislation would put it at a 
serious disadvantage as opposed to similar industries in other parts of the Union. 
As has been shown by experience in existing federations, even such legislation as 
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the restriction of child labour or of working hours becomes difficult to carry out 
for the individual state. (von Hayek 1980 [1939])
Methods of ‘raising revenue’ (i.e. collecting taxes) would be ‘somewhat restricted’ 
for individual states. Greater mobility between states would necessitate avoiding all 
sorts of taxes ‘which would drive capital or labour elsewhere’, but there would also 
be considerable difficulties with many kinds of indirect taxation. In order to prevent 
evasion of guarantees of free movement of ‘men, goods, and capital’, the federation 
must have great power to impose restrictions on political intervention in the economies 
of the Member States. Limitations had to be placed not only on government policies 
but also on economic policies conducted by trade unions, cartels and professional 
associations. Once frontiers between the Member States were opened and free 
movement was secured, the monopolies of those organizations, and their power to 
control supply of their services or products, would cease.
Hayek provided a model of international capital against international labour. He 
did not, however, discuss why market union could not have a social dimension or a 
relatively high tax regime shared by all Member States. He did not discuss why unions 
could not cooperate across Member State borders instead of competing in a race to the 
bottom. Prevention of trade distortions could in his view only be a matter of keeping 
standards down. In religious metaphorical terms, Hayek indicated that a federal 
market could serve as a kind of cleansing purgative designed to make economies fit for 
competition. Purification in the name of ‘progress’ presupposed downward pressure 
on wages and social standards. Coercion and discipline were the key in Hayek’s dream 
of liberty.
In Der Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart, which Röpke published in Swiss exile 
in 1942, he argued for the third way between socialism and laissez-faire capitalism, 
although in a different way from Child in his book on Sweden, emphasizing legal 
rather than political primacy. Ordoliberalism was Christian in its design. The masters 
of the narrative were all Protestants but their appeal was trans-confessional and also 
attracted Catholics in Germany. In Civitas humana (1944), Röpke argued that Pius XI’s 
papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno in 1931 on the ethical implications of the social 
and economic order, issued against the backdrop of the Great Depression and mass 
unemployment, forty years after Leo XIII’s encyclical Rerum Novarum addressing 
the conditions of workers around 1890, at heart came to the same conclusion as 
Röpke’s own liberal–conservative socio-economic philosophy (Röpke 1948: xvii). 
The legal-political constructs of Röpke and Hayek, ordoliberalism and neo-liberalism 
respectively, were clearly quite different in their views on the connections between 
law and politics and in their search for meaning in the past: politics as a continuous 
correction of liberal economies, on the one side, and, on the other side, the rejection of 
politics in forms other than monitoring the rule of the market.
Since the 1980s, Röpke had, in the neo-liberal rhetoric, been linked to the 
protagonists of neo-liberalism, Mises and Hayek, as if they were all three thinkers of the 
same school. Röpke was co-opted into neo-liberalism despite the fact that he abandoned 
the term and argued for ordoliberalism with a social face. When ordoliberalism has 
been recognized in academic literature since the 1980s as the legal foundation of the 
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European integration project, the reference has been exclusively to competition rules. 
The fact that both ordoliberalism and the early phases of European integration involved 
a social component hand in hand with the competition rules in mutually reinforcing 
dynamics does not appear in the derivation of an ordoliberal European heritage.5 The 
next section will comment further on the connection between social commitments 
and competition rules in both ordoliberalism and European integration.
The connection between Röpke, on the one side, and Mises and Hayek, on the other, 
is marked by differences rather than similarities. Röpke referred in the Social Crisis to 
the historical blindness of liberalism that created a false choice between socialism and 
capitalism. The choice was clear to Mises and Hayek, but Röpke was looking for a 
third way between the two theoretical approaches to the economy. This hijacking of 
ordoliberalism by the neo-liberals, and its later acceptance by ignorant critics of neo-
liberalism, was an expression of the ideological force of neo-liberalism in its second 
wave between the 1980s and 2008.
One might argue that ordoliberalism inverts the relationship between the political 
and the economic in its plea for an economic constitution as a free-standing foundation 
of the polity, neglecting the concept of popular sovereignty. It is then important 
to emphasize that in early ordoliberal thought the economy involved a clear social 
dimension and an elaborated link to the social tasks of the state. It was neo-liberalism in 
the design of Hayek that radicalized the economic constitution and cut the social link. 
From neo-liberalism, a link emerged to liberal authoritarianism through economic 
fundamentalism with austerity as an instrument. But it is historically wrong to connect 
ordoliberalism to this development.6
Ordoliberal ideas were to influence the post–1945 European integration project in 
its early phases but not in the sense that the neo-liberals would argue in their post-
Maastricht outline of the past.
Recreation of values: The European integration project, the 
modernization narrative, ordoliberalism and Keynesianism
The historical experiences that drove the reconstruction of European values after 1945 
rejected the arguments of Schmitt. At the same time, though, the architects of the new 
Europe also had doubts about the capacity of the liberal alternative. They were looking 
for a legal rather than a liberal political alternative to Schmitt, a normative framework 
to prevent a reiteration of the liberal collapse. In Western Europe after 1945, Weimar 
served as a warning example, reinforced by the other warning example of the revolution 
that led to the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The insight in Western Europe was that democracy could be 
dangerous and therefore had to be controlled. The rule of the people could be the point 
of departure for politics in very different directions. Moreover, it could be manipulated. 
Memories were still fresh of how close to each other the various responses to the crisis 
in the 1930s had been before the differences became obvious.
The fragility of democracy was what the fathers of the European integration 
project wanted to change. They wanted to establish a stable and predictable political 
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order. They wanted democracy based on rational rule instead of the charismatic and 
traditional leadership during the era of the world wars to stay with Weber’s categories. 
Technocrats were expected to guarantee rational democracy. Their instrument was 
welfare for the allegiance of the masses, but differently from the Third Reich. From 
the beginning, the European integration project was designed as a rule-governed 
technocracy, not a democracy, with the aim of guaranteeing democracy in the Member 
States through the prospects of social citizenship. This was the policy of European 
rescue of nation states (Milward 1992).
Ordoliberalism in the design of Röpke, Rüstow, Eucken and other economists along 
with like-minded lawyers fitted well with this (West) European integration approach. 
In the early drafts of Jean Monnet, competition law to prevent cartels and capital 
concentration and to provide a legal framework for the market was linked to the issue 
of social standards. Although competition was considered to be the key to cheaper and 
better production, it would not occur through lowering labour standards. The plan was 
intended to appeal beyond narrow business interests and, to that end, it addressed the 
question of wages. Monnet’s original idea was to give the High Authority, which in the 
Rome Treaty in 1957 became the Commission, wide-ranging powers in the area of wages 
but remained somewhat ambiguous as to the substance. Wage dumping was obviously 
to be prohibited, but Monnet also envisaged wages as an instrument for promoting 
better standards of living. The Dutch negotiators, supported by the Germans, rejected 
any such powers for the High Authority, whereas the Belgians, whose wages were the 
highest, solidly supported the social definition of the wage issue since, in practice, it 
would mean that the other Member States would have to promote higher wages. The 
French were split. The Italian position was more complicated because its steel industry, 
which was a low-wage sector with high unit-labour costs, was overmanned. In the end, 
Monnet’s vision was narrowed down to a prohibition of wage dumping (Griffith 1986).
A European rule-governed technocracy defining the legal borders of the economy 
in terms of competition rules and securing democracy through provision of welfare by 
the Member States required the legitimacy of a convincing narrative. After 1945, US 
American historians and social scientists wrote the history of the victors around the 
theme of modernization. The functionalist narrative on modernization by the American 
social sciences described how superstition became reason, how backwardness became 
progress, how absolutism became democracy and how poverty became welfare. They 
established a development norm from which everybody could benefit in and beyond 
Europe. The United States was at the top of the development scale, constituting both 
the norm and the goal of economic and political development. Barrington Moore 
epitomized this narrative with his classic on the origin of dictatorship and democracy 
(Moore 1966). In his analysis, the key was treatment of the social question and class 
differences by the political system. Moore initiated a research trend under the buzzword 
of modernization. A narrative emerged where the final goal of modernization was 
democracy and welfare. It was now that democracy as a consequence of Enlightenment 
philosophy, not the world wars, became a core dimension of (West) European self-
understanding. The modernization researchers built one bridge to the Enlightenment 
over the gap of the world wars and another between capitalism and democracy, 
political and economic reason and progress over the gap of the Great Depression and 
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social destitution. This was the master narrative under which the European integration 
project evolved from fascism to (West) European unification.
The post-war necessity to re-establish a new Europe on its own ruins automatically 
created an expansive demand situation, in the shape of the reconstruction boom 
of the 1950s and 1960s. The emerging economies of growth and welfare, with full 
employment and a reasonable distribution of incomes and fortunes, created a basis 
for mutually reinforcing dynamics between mass consumption and mass production, 
demand and supply, in contrast to the people’s democracies of Eastern Europe. The first 
priority and lesson from the experiences of the Great Depression in the 1930s, when 
the beginning of the (West) European integration project was negotiated in Paris in 
1950 against the backdrop of the Korean War, was the connection between a strong 
welfare economy and democracy. The experiences of the economic crisis in the 1930s 
told how easily democracy could lose its way without a strong social commitment. 
These experiences were only some fifteen years old. Welfare was the currency for 
buying political allegiance, at least in the view that emerged in Paris. An economy 
based on a common market would provide resources for welfare. Through a general 
distribution of welfare, the European leaders created a contrast to the hardships in 
the Soviet system. General welfare generated by a rule-governed European market 
economy with a social face fitted very well with the ordoliberal imagery of Röpke, 
Rüstow and others. Economic growth through ordoliberal competition rules would 
provide the scope for an economically efficient social Europe.
John Maynard Keynes, too, contributed to the legitimizing economic theory 
that gave an interpretative frame for development in Western Europe. The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), written in response to the Great 
Depression, was a theory for full employment policies in the industrial economies 
with a social psychological component emphasizing the importance of confidence 
in the future. Keynes argued that a new Great Depression could be avoided through 
political management of the economy, where a key political task was to infuse social 
feelings of certainty and security as a corrective to the experiences of precariousness 
and uncertainty that the capitalist system brought.7 He argued that the economy was 
a polity, not the other way round, as would be strongly argued half a century later.8 
The technocratic application of his theory (Keynesianism) after the Second World War 
made him a mechanic provider of a toolkit for the maintenance of economic growth, 
where growth became permanent through political techniques and Keynes’s insistence 
on uncertainty as the basic precondition of capitalism disappeared behind the imagery 
of permanent growth. In the political practices of Keynesianism, economic theory 
became like ordoliberalism: a kind of economic constitution, or at least convention, 
which provided the rules for political intervention in the economy.
This macroeconomic Keynesianism of political management and dirigisme (state 
control of economic and social matters) was clearly at odds with the ordoliberal 
imaginary which envisaged market competition with a microeconomic and legal 
focus. However, their attention to the social issue connected them, while the booming 
reconstruction economy hid the differences. The success of the West European 
economies, with growth and full employment, confirmed the Keynesian theory of 
full employment and belief in ordoliberal competition rules. A permanent solution 
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to economic growth and full employment appeared to be a possibility. With a focus 
on social cohesion, ordoliberalism and Keynesianism emphasized legal and political 
primacy respectively under awareness of the fact that the two dimensions of social 
life are entangled. Overlapping interpretative frameworks linked the political, the 
social, the economic and the legal in a stable relationship, outlining a post-war (West) 
European utopia of political and social stability as well as progress through continuous 
economic growth.
The (West) European nation states were defined in civic and social rather than in 
ethnic terms, in close cooperation with other nation states, as national communities 
of destiny on the basis of welfare and (West) European cooperation (‘integration’), and 
cohesion imposed by the Cold War.
The crisis of the 1970s
The crisis of the 1970s destroyed this (West) European political-legal-economic-social 
dynamic equilibrium of growth legitimized by and confirming the modernization 
narrative and the European heritage of Enlightenment rationalism. This dynamic 
equilibrium probably came rather close to the dreams of the exiled German scholars 
in Britain during the Second World War who mobilized Roman law for historical 
legitimacy. The arrangement was experienced as stable. The legal and political framing 
of the European economies promoted social peace through economic growth and 
redistribution of yields. This legal and political framing employed ever less Roman 
law à la Koschaker and Catholic religion as points of reference. The modernization 
narrative and belief in teleological progress moved the attention forwards rather 
than backwards.
The end of the 1960s brought strains to European full employment economies as 
workers radicalized their language in a struggle for a bigger share of the economic 
yield, better working conditions and a reduction in job-related stress. The conflict level 
grew and claims for economic democracy accompanied strikes, sits-ins and lockouts. 
Claims went beyond the mere issue of wages and developed into a struggle about 
the workplace more generally, centring on concepts such as economic democracy, 
co-determination, autogestion, Mitbestimmung and state ownership. This struggle, 
in turn, was intertwined with a larger generational revolt, which in Europe began in 
France and spread throughout Western Europe, but went beyond Europe as a worldwide 
escalation of social conflicts and peoples’ rebellions against militarism and capitalism, 
bourgeoisie and bureaucracy. The Prague Spring was its East European version. The 
year 1968 also saw the birth of the environmental and anti-nuclear movements.
Against the backdrop of general internal radicalization, external factors began to 
undermine Europe’s welfare economies during the first half of the 1970s. The post-
war Bretton Woods order based on the dollar, agreed on in 1944, collapsed in 1971. 
The next blow came in the autumn of 1973 with the oil price shock, which initiated 
the beginning of a new international world order, a decrease in the power of the old 
European industrial economies and a growing scope of action for those third world 
countries producing raw materials.
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Key industries such as coal, steel and shipbuilding broke down and mass 
unemployment occurred for the first time since the 1930s. The ordoliberal social 
market economy – based on competition rules and distribution of labour between 
the European market for economic growth and Member State responsibility for the 
distribution of social welfare – did not function. The same is true of the Keynesian 
toolkit. The development was generally considered impossible within the Keynesian 
interpretative framework which provided the toolkit for the management of full 
employment economies. Memories of the impact on the political system of social 
protests in the 1930s came back and alarmed European governments. They intervened 
with massive subsidy packages to stop or slow down industrial decline. Lobbyism and the 
corporatism of organized interests took on a new magnitude, bypassing the ordoliberal 
distinction between conform and non-conform state intervention in the economy. The 
accumulation of massive state debts accelerated inflation under conditions of economic 
stagnation, a development which ran counter to the theoretical economic wisdom of 
Keynesianism. The new phenomenon acquired a new name: stagflation.
Ordoliberal and Keynesian ideas progressively lost credibility in the wake of 
accelerating unemployment, growing public budget deficits and increasing inflation. 
The imagery of proactive management of the economy shifted to the imagery of 
political helplessness with only a reactive capacity. The development bypassed 
the ordoliberal framework, in particular the competition rules. A new economic 
orthodoxy emerged with deep roots in liberal philosophy, prescribing a lesser role for 
the state and promoting greater market freedom. The market would heal economies 
from corporatist sclerosis through state management. A new magic word − flexibility 
− promised a panacea. The neo-liberal turn occurred within a larger framework 
of ideological reorientation where many of the ideas of 1968 around the theme of 
de-hierarchization and co-determination were redefined by the political right and 
employers, who appropriated the priority of interpretation. They took over the 1968 
language against hierarchies and channelled it in new directions where not least the 
trade unions became a target of attack.
The 1970s and 1980s saw a huge conceptual confrontation about the redefinition of 
key concepts such as freedom, equality, solidarity, economic distribution, welfare, state 
and market. A new semantic field emerged where government, which used to connote 
state hierarchy with legal and political guarantees of welfare and social standards, 
shifted to the softer and more market-oriented governance accompanied by terms such 
as network and coordination, signalling a retreat from ordoliberal legal prescriptions 
as well as political ambitions to steer and rule. The reform concept had come to mean 
social reform since the emergence of the social question as a political problem in the 
1830s in particular. Now a redefinition began with the aim of cleansing the term of 
any social content. The Keynesian honorary term full employment disappeared from 
the political vocabulary like the concept of welfare state. Previously, the concept of 
employment was closely connected to rules of certain standards. This connection 
disappeared in the new vocabulary and the connection to social security eroded. 
New critical concepts, such as the two-thirds society, emerged in order to describe 
the development from the left. Social marginalization was the instrument to create 
political stability in a turbulent time.
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A new labour market organization reflected the conceptual transformation. The 
labour force was increasingly divided between a core of company-loyal employees with 
fixed employment, on the one hand, and temporary employees, on the other. Around 
the core, new strata of temporary employment emerged in various forms through 
outsourcing or hiring and firing with far more precarious employment conditions and 
future prospects. The reserve army of labour that Marx and Engels had identified in 
the 1860s re-emerged.
The seeming breakthrough of working-class ideals about work in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, with key terms such as economic democracy, co-determination and 
state ownership, coupled with the apparent step towards realization of the Marxist 
view of industrial society that it signalled, contained the germs of the dissolution of 
the working class in its historically established form. The end of industrial society 
in its centenary existence, where work provided social inclusion and existential 
meaning, shifted to social exclusion and loss of meaning for many without a workplace 
identification. State-guaranteed universal social citizenship rights split up in company-
specific welfare arrangements and benefits for core employees and emergency relief 
for the marginalized part of the labour force with occasional work and pay. Employees 
doing the same job and having the same qualifications, working next to each other 
at machines and conveyor belts or in offices, could have very different wages and 
salaries. It is not difficult to imagine the long-term impact of this development on 
social cohesion and political allegiance.
The breakdown of national patterns of solidarity meant that mass unemployment 
did not represent the same political problem and threat to social stability as was first 
anticipated in the 1970s. Instead of social revolution, the period witnessed stabilization 
through social marginalization and a cultural retreat to old Darwinian metaphors, 
according to which it became generally accepted that only the stronger could expect 
to survive in the fight for survival in hardening markets (Stråth 2000; Wagner 2000). 
Economic liberalism sped up and political liberalism lagged behind in the wake of 
the growing tension between the national institutional framework of economies and 
the global performance of economies based on global component flows from regions 
with cheap labour to the labour-saving assembly of components in regions with 
higher labour costs. In the wake of this development, the question of social standards 
and employment security obtained a new dimension beyond the political control of 
national governments.
The 1970s and 1980s were a great divide in the history of modern Europe. After 
initial attempts to save collapsing industries, the fundamental transformation of rule-
governed and politically managed welfare economies and labour markets went hand in 
hand with political exit from the guarantee of certain social standards and the decline 
of Keynesian welfare states and the ordoliberal imageries of social market economies. 
Keynes’s emphasis on confidence in the future changed to experience of the opposite: 
general uncertainty about the future. This was a fundamental change.9
Propagation of a powerful neo-liberal economic vocabulary went hand in hand 
with a major ideological shift to neo-liberalism. Economic theory stood as the core 
of the new ideology. Hayek replaced Keynes and the German soziale Marktwirtschaft. 
Flexibility replaced welfare as the key socio-economic concept. The welfare state was 
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put off as the tax-and-debt state. In the academic underpinning of the conceptual 
transformation, public choice replaced public finance as a field of investigation. This 
shift in academic-political perspective had four protagonists: Hayek, Milton Friedman, 
Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.
In the 1980s, Hayek and Friedman appeared with evermore convincing 
prescriptions for getting the economy on track again. The new neo-liberal language 
mixed Friedman’s monetarist approach and Hayek’s belief in the market process 
and the central role of prices rather than the state as regulator of the economy. Their 
argument was that if there was unemployment it was because wages were too high, and 
if there was inflation it was because governments spent too much. They contradicted 
Keynes’s demand orientation where government spending was the right prescription 
in order to boost consumer purchasing power and consumer demand. To answer why 
Hayek’s and Milton’s neo-liberal narrative gained credibility, we must look at the great 
transformation that took place from the 1970s onwards. The new labour markets and 
the appropriation of the radical language of the 1968 movement by employers under 
the motto of ‘small is beautiful’ and ‘flexibility’ reinforced each other.
Even in 1939, Hayek’s neo-liberalism, with his outline of the race-to-the-bottom 
customs union, was diametrically different from Eucken’s, Rüstow’s and Röpke’s 
ordoliberal social market economy which, however, as we saw, did not prevent later neo-
liberal thinkers as well as their critics from unhistorically incorporating the concept of 
ordoliberal in the neo-liberal vocabulary, which is an affront against Eucken, Rüstow 
and Röpke and their fellows (Röpke 1948: xvii). The Roman legacy and the ordoliberal 
imagery of a legal-political framing of the economy disappeared behind the neo-liberal 
hegemonic economistic view of self-regulating markets beyond political control.
The value crisis of the 2010s
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 2008 hit the financial world like a bolt 
from the blue. The collapse developed into a banking crisis which provoked massive 
state intervention under the motto of ‘too big to fail’. This led to a state debt crisis and a 
new wave of speculation on the financial markets against state debts, which in turn hit 
the weak Southern Euro economies, Greece in particular. New state guarantees were 
mobilized to bail out speculating banks, German and French in particular, from their 
Greek commitments.
The awakening from the neo-liberal market dream in 2008 was abrupt. The 
experiences from the 1930s that the European leaders wanted to remember told that 
it was disastrous to let big banks fail. The experiences they forgot told that austerity 
politics breaks down political legitimacy and increases xenophobic nationalism. The 
belief of Merkel’s Europe in austerity became a religious dogma with a strong moral 
message that defied empirical observations. The decline of Greek GNP by 25 per cent 
over a five-year period from 2010, with over half of its youth unemployed, did not 
alter this belief. Greece became a test case for political fundamentalism in the centre 
of Europe. The subtext of religious moralism around the concept of debt, which in 
German (Schuld) integrates the double meanings of debt and guilt, triggered a 
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civilizing and disciplining education campaign against attempts to open up alternative 
approaches to political management of the economy. Hayek’s theoretical construct had 
collapsed, but it nevertheless remained the central point of reference in the debate. 
The austerity campaign echoed his 1939 outline of the customs union with the goal 
of imposing financial discipline among the Member States, an economic constitution 
without flexibility, an economistic iron regime (von Hayek 1980 [1939]). The austerity 
approach extended the economic crisis to a political crisis and a value crisis.
Perhaps the most obvious parallel to Weimar is the crisis as mutually reinforcing 
dynamics between economic failure, political incapacity to manage what is ideologically 
imagined as a global economy without borders and the social crisis driven by the loss 
of existential orientation around work. Of course, the full employment societies of 
the 1950s and 1960s did not belong to the historical experience of Weimar. However, 
recurring feelings of uncertainty, precariousness, segmentation and divisions in the 
labour markets since the 1970s very much belonged to the Weimar experience. These 
dynamics have brought the breakdown of European core values with their origin in the 
Enlightenment project: breakdown in the sense of incapacity to communicate about 
their contentious meanings.
There is one difference. The value crisis in the 1930s dealt with the possibility of 
truth and objectivity. The solution to that value crisis was found through relativizing 
the imageries of truth and objectivity, the decline of positivism, and dissolution of the 
strong distinction between science and fiction. The present epistemological value crisis 
is deeper since it questions our imagery of human autonomy, the human as the gauge 
of everything, human responsibility for creation of the future and the capacity to shape 
it. In other words, the core message of human sciences is at stake against the backdrop 
of a powerful ideological language proclaiming that economic processes are driven 
by natural forces beyond human control. This was the belief that triggered austerity 
politics both in the 1930s and today.
Parliamentary representative democracy was an ideal but far from a European 
standard since Enlightenment philosophy and the American and French revolutions. 
The question is what the economic crisis since 2008 and, more generally, the rapid 
digital development of global financial capitalism has meant for the preconditions of 
representative democracy centred on legislative assemblies.
In his dictum ‘the sovereign is the one who declares a state of emergency’, Schmitt 
redefined ‘sovereignty’ from its original locus in theories of democracy in the 
legislature as representation of the people to the executive, which, after proclaiming a 
state of exception, used it to eliminate or restrict the ability of the legislative assembly 
to control the executive. The parliament-circumventing proclamation of a state of 
exception has become normal practice in contemporary democratic orders, not 
least in the framework of the politics of Euro rescue (Höreth 2008). The European 
legal order has lost the power of orientation and guidance with the consequence, in 
a strong argument by Dieter Grimm, that the Commission and the European Court 
of Justice have retreated to market activism in the only field where they still have 
interpretative power: competition rules (Grimm 2016; Grimm 2014; Grimm 2013). 
This Commission and ECJ market activism without a social dimension, coordinating 
and monitoring capital concentration and inviting lobby influence by big corporate 
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business, is far from the ordoliberal market vision of competition rules for a social 
Europe in the formulation almost seventy years ago. And the imagery of a Roman law 
legacy is even more remote.
The reference by Angela Merkel to a decision of the Council in response to bank 
rescues and the Euro crisis as alternativlos is a case in point for the view that markets 
are beyond human control. In a contradictory but consistent way this argument goes 
hand in hand with the legal market activism that Grimm refers to. Even before the 
collapse of the financial markets in 2008, Giorgio Agamben had seen the development 
coming and argued that the distinction between democracy and dictatorship has 
disappeared.10 This is a strong formulation without nuances, but authoritarianism 
is undoubtedly gaining ground in Europe and elsewhere. In Schmitt’s view, the 
proclaimer of a state of exception appropriates the rights of the legislature generally, 
which is too strong a description of the present situation (Maus 2011: 7‒8). However, 
the question is whether in practice, in the present parliamentary orders, the executive 
does not exert legislative functions. Of course, there is always the possibility of electing 
a new legislature and executive, but what difference would it make in attempts to react 
to global financial capitalism as in the Euro crisis? And is the execution of financial 
and monetary policies by the president of the European Central Bank, Mario Draghi, 
against the backdrop of the lack of a European fiscal regime, not an illustration of what 
Marx before Schmitt in the Eighteenth Brumaire described as die Verselbständigung 
des Exekutivgewalts, the emancipation of the executive authority? Or is it a silent 
delegation of power beyond constitutional cover due to a failure to agree on a common 
fiscal policy in the European Council?
Roman law as a legal legacy of Europe is no longer a relevant issue. European law 
– under ever fewer references to Roman law − has lost legitimacy under conditions 
of legal market activism. The same goes for ordoliberalism, after its incorporation 
into neo-liberalism. Röpke’s second, negative interpretation of the Roman legal 
heritage as legitimacy of centralized absolutism fits with the present development of 
authoritarianism, although this development is occurring at the Member State rather 
than the European level. The alternative legacy binary in Röpke’s interpretation, 
legitimization of individual private ownership rights, has shifted to legitimization of 
private corporate power and capital concentration, and mutated into his second Roman 
binary in the shape of ‘centralized absolutism’. However, the imagery of a centralized 
Europe is rapidly losing contours, too. Europe is no longer a threat. The threat is the 
collapse of Europe itself.
The ongoing search for national identities is guided, not by a belief in progress and a 
wide horizon of expectations but by the narrow identification of enemies. Interest-based 
inclusive solidarity is no longer the key in the search for identity, but rather emotional 
exclusion. Accumulated experience since the 1830s of the need for interest-based 
social solidarity for the successful construction of community culminated in Röpke’s 
ordoliberal social market-economic imagery and in post-Keynesian Keynesianism, 
which were abandoned in the 1970s. Hayek’s neo-liberal market Europe has failed to 
develop an alternative framework for identification. Moreover, a narrow and exclusive 
ethnic nationalism is replacing the dissolution of the horizons of the 1990s after the 
end of the Cold War. Civic and socially inclusive national solidarity and feelings of 
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community, constructed during the Cold War period before 1971, are declining. The 
crisis of the 1970s was a watershed in European history. And we are still living in the 
shadow of that crisis. Our ongoing crisis since 2008 can be seen as the second half of 
one long crisis. After the decline of the modernization and globalization narratives, 
no convincing, mobilizing and legitimizing European narrative has emerged to 
replace them.
Roman law, in a thick genealogy full of nuances, might – together with social 
market-economic ordoliberalism − have been a founding stone of the European 
integration project after 1945, a foundation myth that demarcated Europe from its 
Nazi and fascist heritage. However, this view of the Roman legacy is problematic and 
ambiguous in its oscillation between individual autonomy and centralized absolutism, 
as Röpke argued. Few today believe in the individual autonomy of European Union 
(EU) citizens. The EU as the incarnation of centralized absolutism was a horrifying 
picture earlier in the 1990s, when some critics feared a federalization of Europe, and 
occasionally linked their concern to Schmitt’s Großraum theory as a warning example 
for the internal market (Joerges and Ghaleigh 2003). Recent developments towards 
de-Europeanization and renationalization indicate a general erosion of the legal 
foundation of the EU, so that questions of the Roman legacy seem less relevant. The EU 
is losing legitimacy both as a political and as a normative legal order (Tuori and Tuori 
2014). In the present state of confusion and political paralysis, not only is the future 
unclear but also the past. Earlier crises triggered the search for roots and origins but 
only in connection with a search for new futures. The ongoing European muddling-
through politics of presentism has little bearing on the future and little interest in the 
past. The search for new futures and pasts is taking place in nation states under a 
growing connection to authoritarianism.
Notes
1 ‘Definierbar ist nur das was keine Geschichte hat.’ Nietzsche 1980 [1887]: 820.
2 Grotke and Prutsch 2014; Sellin 2014; Stråth 2016. For a problematization and histori-
cization of teleological views, see Trüper, Chakrabarty and Subrahmanyam 2015.
3 Schmitt 1926; Schmitt 1928; Schmitt 1939. Concerning Stresemann, Locarno and 
Poland, see Stråth 2016: 276.
4 Röpke 1944. Quotation is from the English translation, Röpke 1948: xvii.
5 For a survey of this debate, see Solchany 2015: 11‒33. Patel and Schweitzer 2013: 10 
argue that ordoliberal ideas indeed influenced the evolution of European Union com-
petition law during the foundational period following the Treaty of Rome in 1957, but 
that it was no simple transposition of ordoliberalism from the German setting to the 
Community. Only specific features of ordoliberal thinking such as individual rights 
and the rule of law provided a good fit. They are thus aware of the existence of other 
dimensions of ordoliberalism without naming them, but they do not mention the 
social political aim in Jean Monnet’s design of the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity. Ramirez Pérez and van de Scheur 2013 connects ordoliberalism to the neo-liberal 
orbit: ‘Competition law had thus become a goal in itself, and competition law became 
more Ordo liberal.’ The merger of the two concepts is complete in Dale and El-Enany 
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2013: 614, ‘The EU has displayed familiar characteristics: A lack of democratic 
method and a commitment to a neoliberal (or ordoliberal) doctrine.’ Cf. also Wilkin-
son 2013: 543, ‘Closely related to what is commonly now referred to as neo-liberalism, 
ordoliberalism is, one might say, simply more honest and straightforward about the 
role of the strong state in guaranteeing the “free economy”, which is hardly free and 
ensuring “the rules of the game,” which are bent when necessary.’
6 Cf. Wilkinson 2013: 554, who tends to discern a link between ordoliberalism and 
liberal authoritarianism.
7 An immense literature is available on Keynes and Keynesianism. See, for instance, 
Backhouse and Bateman 2011 and Skidelsky 2009. Cf. Magnusson and Stråth 2016: 
chapter 2.
8 Joerges, Stråth and Wagner 2005. See for Keynesianism Clarke 1998: chapter 10 and  
Magnusson and Stråth 2016: chapter 2.
9 For the great transformation in the 1970s, see Stråth and Wagner 2017: chapter 9. See 
also Stråth 2000; Wagner 2000.
10 Agamben 2005. For a critical comment on Agamben, see Maus 2011: 7‒8.
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